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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
All the parties to this proceeding are identified in the 
caption. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). The Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals on or 
about June 6, 1994. 
V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Has the plaintiff/appellant demonstrated that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict? The 
standard of review for this issue is whether, when "viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). The appellate 
court must assume the jury believed the evidence and inferences 
that support the verdict. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 
P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989). If the appellant fails to properly 
marshal the evidence, appellate courts refuse to consider the 
appeal and summarily affirm the trial court. Oneida/SLIC v. 
Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
2. Has plaintiff/appellant waived any claim of improper 
jury contact? Defendant/appellee agrees with plaintiff that the 
proper standard of review for this issue is whether the trial 
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court abused its discretion. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-39 
(Utah 1994). 
3. Was there any prejudicial appeal to "sympathy," and is 
plaintiff now barred from raising this issue because it was not 
included in plaintiff's Docketing Statement? The standard of 
review for this issue is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State 
v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The determinative rules are Rules 59(a) and 61 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Addendum, Tab A.) 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings. Disposition in 
the Lower Court 
This is a child dart-out case. On October 27, 1989, then 
four-year-old Reynold Johnson, III darted out on his bicycle from 
the west side of the paved north/south main highway in Manti, 
Utah and pedalled his bicycle into the side of a trailer being 
towed by Mr. Michael K. Coons behind Coons' northbound motor 
vehicle. Johnson filed suit in the Sixth Judicial District Court 
in and for Sanpete County, suing Coons for alleged negligence. 
In June 1993 the parties entered into a Stipulation and Motion, 
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reduced to the trial court's Order, to try the case on liability, 
only, damages agreed upon in a fixed amount if liability 
attached. (See Stipulation, Motion and Order in the Addendum at 
Tab B; Record at 60-61.) Liability was tried to a jury on 
August 4, 5, and 6, 1993. The jury found, on a Special Verdict, 
that defendant Michael K. Coons was not negligent. (Addendum, 
Tab C; Record at 213.) Judgment was entered on the Special 
Verdict in favor of defendant, and against plaintiff, no cause of 
action. (Addendum, Tab D; Record at 218-19.) Plaintiff's post-
trial motions were duly denied. (Addendum, Tabs E, F and G; 
Record at 273-75, 291-93, 327-28.) This appeal followed. The 
Utah Supreme Court duly transferred this appeal to this honorable 
Court. 
B. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for 
Review 
On October 27, 1989 defendant Coons was driving his van 
northbound on the main north/south state highway through Manti, 
Utah. Coons was towing a trailer behind his van. Coons was 
going 30 miles an hour, 5 miles below the speed limit. (Tr. Vol. 
I, pp. 199-200.) 
Plaintiff Reynold Johnson, III, then four years old, darted 
out on his bicycle from the west side of the highway. Johnson 
pedalled his bicycle into the side of the trailer being towed 
behind Coons' northbound motor vehicle, resulting in personal 
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injuries to Johnson.1 In his closing argument to the jury, 
plaintiff's lawyer, Mr. Wells, admitted that the child, Johnson, 
rode his bike into the side of the trailer being towed behind 
defendant Coons' motor vehicle as it proceeded northbound. 
("'The boy hit us,' he says. Sure, he [plaintiff Johnson] hit 
him [defendant Coons]." (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 564, lines 17.) Coons 
was, at all times, in the proper lanes for northbound traffic. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 206.) Coons never, at any time, exceeded 30 mph 
in the 35-mile-per-hour zone. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 200.) Johnson 
travelled from west to east until Johnson ran into the side of 
Coons' trailer. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 180, lines 7-9.) 
VIII. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY 
VERDICT. 
Plaintiff has not, as plaintiff is required to do, 
marshalled the evidence that supports the jury verdict. The 
evidence supports the verdict. Plaintiff's theory of the case 
consists of erroneous notions of law and fallacious arguments 
independent witness Rolland Bagley testified: 
Q: Then the boy on the bike ran into the 
trailer; is that the way it was? 
A: Yes. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 180, lines 7-9.) 
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rejected by the jury. The mere fact that an accident happens 
does not mean, as plaintiff is convinced, that Coons was 
negligent. Coons did not have a duty to "slow down." Coons did 
not have a duty to lock in his undivided attention, to the 
exclusion of all else on and around the roadway, to the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff urges that on different facts there would 
have been no accident, and that consequently the court must find 
that defendant Coons was negligent. Plaintiff's "reasoning" is 
just another form of the unpersuasive conclusion that if none of 
us ever drove motor vehicles, there would never be motor vehicle 
accidents. The trial court properly denied plaintiff's motions 
for directed verdict, J.N.O.V., and new trial. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF IMPROPER JURY 
CONTACT. 
Plaintiff's "evidence" of improper jury contact consists of 
the affidavits of plaintiff's lawyer/guardian, the legal assis-
tant for plaintiff's lawyer/guardian, and plaintiff's mother, all 
of whom were present throughout the jury trial. All complained 
of conduct they allege they witnessed before the jury deliber-
ated, yet none complained until a month after a jury verdict that 
did not please them. Plaintiff waived any claim of improper jury 
contact. 
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POINT III 
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL APPEAL TO 
"SYMPATHY." 
Plaintiff has "unclean hands" to complain about "sympathy." 
The extremely minute portion of defendant's opening statement, 
not closing argument, about which plaintiff now complains was not 
a "sympathy" argument. At trial plaintiff either blessed or 
waived what he now condemns. The trial judge gave the jury 
repeat instructions to not decide the case on sympathy, and 
defense counsel at trial also asked the jury to decide the case 
on the facts, not sympathy. Finally, if there was any jury 
sympathy for defendant Coons, it resulted from the abusive, 
protracted examination of Coons by plaintiff's counsel in front 
of the jury, not from any prejudicial appeal to sympathy. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY 
VERDICT. 
A. Plaintiff Has Not. As Required. Marshalled the Evidence that 
Supports the Jury Verdict. 
In Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that on an appeal based on 
alleged insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence must be 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (in 
this case, defendant Coons), and that the appellant must first 
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marshall the evidence in support of the verdict, and only then 
proceed to show that the evidence is insufficient. This, 
plaintiff has utterly failed to do, omitting, among a great many 
other things, testimony of two defense accident reconstruction 
experts, including Captain Knight's expert opinion that the only 
thing Coons could have done that he didn't do to avoid this 
accident was be "clairvoyant." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 468, lines 3-
23.) 
In Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. Inc.. 872 
P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994), this Court specifically refused to 
consider the appeal and summarily affirmed the trial court 
because the appellant failed to marshal the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings.2 
2This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that 
appellate courts "do not sit to retry cases submitted 
on disputed facts.". . . Accordingly, "[w]hen the duty 
to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to 
consider the merits of challenges to the findings and 
accept the findings as valid.". . . 
Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's factual findings. Rather 
than bearing its marshalling burden, Oneida has merely 
presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of 
trial testimony in support of its position. Such 
selective citation to the record does not begin to 
marshal the evidence; it is nothing more than an 
attempt to reargue the case before this court--a tactic 
that we reject. • . . Because Oneida has failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings, we hold that those findings are accurate and 
affirm the trial court's dismissal based on those 
findings. 
Id. at 1053 (citations omitted). 
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In late December 1994, plaintiff filed his Brief on Appeal 
from a three-day jury trial in August 1993, complaining first, 
foremost, and primarily of alleged "insufficiency of the 
evidence" to support the verdict, yet plaintiff has made no 
attempt to comply with this most rudimentary "marshaling" 
requirement of appealing on this ground, despite frequent and 
repeated guidance from the appellate courts of this state on this 
point. This Court should follow Oneida and summarily affirm the 
trial court and refuse to consider this appeal. 
B. The Evidence Supports the Verdict. 
The only issue for the jury was whether Coons was negligent. 
(See Stipulation, Motion and Order to try the case on liability 
only at Addendum, Tab B; Record at 60-62.) Although it is 
plaintiff/appellant's, not defendant/appellee's, burden, to 
marshal the evidence that supports the verdict, defendant will 
set forth some of the evidence that supports the verdict: 
1. Captain Knight testified without objection that it was 
his expert opinion that the only thing Coons could have done that 
he did not do to avoid the accident was be "clairvoyant." (Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 468, lines 3-23.) 
Captain Knight also testified that Coons' accident avoidance 
efforts were proper. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 467, lines 5-7). 
Incredibly, Mr. Wells solicited Captain Knight's opinion 
that the accident was Johnson's fault: 
Q: All right. So basically what you're saying is--is 
that this accident is Reynold Johnson's fault? 
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A: I--that's what I've said all along. The boy moved 
out. He hit us in the side. We were almost past 
him. If you change those relative positions and 
those relative times, we don't know what would 
have happened. But we know that the collision 
occurred because he comes in to the trailer when 
we're--we are up there going on past him. 
Q: Are you aware--
A: There's no question about that. 
Q: Are you aware of the fact, Newell, that the Court 
has ruled already that Reynold Johnson has no 
fault in this? 
A: I know what the statute is, as well as you do, Mr. 
Wells, because I know what the presumptions are. 
But I also know what boys do and when I do 
accident reconstruction, I look to see what people 
do wrong, regardless of what the presumptions are 
under the CODE. 
(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 507 and 508.) 
2. Coons testified that he was "attentive" (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
250, line 12), that he "was as attentive as any other driver 
would be" (Tr. Vol. I, p. 250, lines 7-8), that two other cars 
"darn near" hit Johnson (Tr. Vol. I, p. 241, lines 1-2), and that 
the only way he, Coons, could have avoided the accident was if he 
had been looking at Johnson at the moment Johnson started across. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 240, lines 20-21.) 
3. Dave Stevens' expert testimony provided a reasonable 
basis for the jury to conclude that Coons was not negligent: 
A: Ah, because, ah, particularly with boys on 
bicycles, they're very unpredictable. There are many 
things that are unpredictable as we drive our cars on 
the highway. If you're driving down the highway and 
somebody on the opposite side of the road as pedestrian 
steps off the roadway and implies there's a possibility 
of that he will cross the street, that does not start 
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an emergency mode in the mind of the driver of the 
vehicle because there is an extremely high probability 
that person will take appropriate action, allow the car 
to go by before proceeding across the street or may not 
even proceed across the street. 
By the same token, with a boy on a bicycle, their 
actions are so unpredictable that when a driver 
observes a buy [sic] on bicycle, generally speaking, 
unless it is a--a close enough proximity to create an 
immediate obvious emergency, the driver will go into a 
sort of a "wait and see mode, wherein "I'm gonna keep 
on eye on that boy, but I'm not going to make any 
changes or--or make any decisions until I see more 
information." 
And in this case, particularly if a boy rides from 
the opposite side of the street, ah, once again 
applying human factors from studies and understanding 
driver behavior, the driver is not going to begin 
responding to the actions of this boy until the boy 
gives, I guess you could say, body language signals 
that he is, in fact, intending to cross the street. 
Because kids will ride out onto the street and we all 
have had it. I mean I don't think there's a person in 
this room that hasn't experienced the puzzlement of 
wondering what a child on a bicycle is going to do. 
* * * 
Q I understand. Would you consider it prudent 
to start slowing down when you see him start to run? 
A Perhaps. But not always. 
Q In other words you ought to just leave your 
cruise control on and go ahead? 
A It happens all day every day many times. 
* * * 
Q I want you to assume that Mr. Coons testified 
that for two to three seconds he was looking at mirrors 
and doing things, other than looking at the field of 
vision in front of his vehicle as he approached the 
corner, having previously seen children on both sides 
of the street, and I want you to tell me whether, as a 
safety expert, you believe taking your attention away 
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from what's going on in front of you for that period of 
time is a prudent thing for a driver to do. 
A It is because it's normal procedure. 
Q So you think it's prudent to give--take two 
to three seconds away from your attention in front of 
you and do something else. And then what happens if 
during that two to three seconds a child--one of those 
children darts into the road? 
A It is not possible to view children on the 
west side of State Street and 4th North and children on 
the east side of State Street and 4th North at the same 
instant, so there must be movement of eyes. And--and 
in my opinion, a high school education driving 
instructor will tell you that your eyes should be 
constantly moving. 
Q I understand that. 
A Okay. Now it is very possible that a person 
can be looking at a child on the right, because this 
child constitutes, in the eye or in the mind of this 
driver, a greater hazard than the child on the left. 
Q Okay. 
A And at that point, if the child on the left 
starts into the street and darts across, then you see 
the driver's what we might call a sitting duck because 
he was being a prudent driver at the time. By the same 
token, every driver is expected to keep his eye on his 
mirrors. He can look in his mirrors without being a 
negligent driver. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 381, line 17 through p. 282, line 20; p. 416, 
lines 14-19; p. 419, line 4 through p. 420, line 11. (Emphasis 
added.) 
More of Stevens' testimony that constitutes sufficient 
evidence for the jury verdict is set forth infra at pp. 17-18. 
4. Rolland Bagley testified that "the boy on the bike ran 
into the trailer . . ." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 180, lines 7-9.) 
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5. Jamie Johnson, plaintiff's sister, gave testimony that 
poked gaping holes in the plaintiff's theory of the case that the 
child Coons first saw on the side of the street was Johnson. 
From Jamie's testimony, it was entirely reasonable to conclude 
that the child Coons first saw was not Johnson, but one of the 
other children, and that Johnson darted out, unabated, from north 
to south on the west side of the street, then, with no stop, from 
west to east across the main highway, 
Q There's been a little confusion here about a 
piece of paper. Maybe you can help us out. I'd like 
you to take a look at this piece of paper that's been 
marked as EXHIBIT 34, and my question to you is real 
simple. Did you draw that? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that your signature there, Jamie? 
A Yes. 
Q 10-3-89? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q Was it your best recollection at the time? 
A Yes. It was. 
Q Jamie, does your drawing show the path of 
your brother from the gazebo on up to the minute--or 
the second the accident happened? 
A I believe so. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 194, line 23 through p. 195, line 25 and Exhibit 
34, in Addendum at Tab H.) 
If there ever was a case that presented a jury question, 
this case was it. The jury did its best. The plaintiff had a 
full and fair day in court. The jury simply found against the 
plaintiff. For all the reasons presented herein, the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
C. Plaintiff's Theory of the Case Consists of Erroneous Views 
of Law and Fallacious Arguments Rejected by the Jury. 
The "Facts" portion of Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal is not 
made up of "facts" at all, but is simply a rehash of plaintiff's 
theory of the case. 
Plaintiff argues that "uncontroverted evidence" shows that 
the time necessary for plaintiff to traverse the roadway was more 
than sufficient to allow defendant to react and avoid an 
accident. The jury obviously found to the contrary. 
Plaintiff argues that the physical evidence did not coincide 
with Mr. Coons' testimony. Again, this is plaintiff's theory of 
the case--it is obviously not what the jury concluded. 
Plaintiff relies on Holmes v. Nelson. 326 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1958), a 37-year old case, which was decided not only prior to 
the Liability Reform Act of 1986, but also fifteen years prior to 
the Comparative Negligence Act of 1973. A major difference 
between the Holmes case and this case is that in the Holmes case 
the defendant saw the child leaving the sidewalk after the 
southbound car (not the defendant's car) passed the children. 
"Defendant saw the children himself when he was 200 feet south of 
where the child was struck. A car approached from the north and 
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defendant observed the children move back to permit the 
southbound car to pass. Defendant's car and the southbound car 
passed at a point about 100 to 125 feet south of the point of 
impact." Id. at 723. 
The Court: After this car passed you going the 
other way you saw the child. Then where was the child 
when you first saw it after the car passed you? 
A The child was coming off the sidewalk north 
of the Holmes' driveway. 
The Court: He was how far off the sidewalk at 
that time? 
A Off the sidewalk, oh - directly off the road 
probably 10 or 12 feet. 
The Court: 10 or 12 feet off the sidewalk or off 
the road? 
A Off the road. He was just leaving the 
sidewalk when I observed him the first time. 
Id. at 724. 
Thus, in the Holmes case, the defendant saw the child come 
off the sidewalk and come on into the street for some 
considerable time and distance. In this case, however, defendant 
Coons did not see the child until the child had actually darted 
substantially across the southbound lanes. 
Moreover, there was a fundamental question for the jury as 
to whether the child that Coons saw off to the west side of the 
street as he approached from the south was in fact the child that 
actually darted out sometime later, i.e., Reynold Johnson. The 
testimony of Reynold's sister, Jamie Johnson, and her diagram 
created shortly after the accident must be kept in mind. Jamie 
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clearly had Reynold darting all the way from the gazebo on the 
northwest corner of the intersection clear on across the street. 
Again, plaintiff's Brief is just another recitation of 
plaintiff's theory of the case, which the jury didn't have to 
agree with and obviously did not agree with. 
1. The mere fact that an accident happened does not mean 
Coons was negligent. 
Plaintiff states as a "fact" that "the evidence clearly 
shows the accident was preventable." Plaintiff's lawyer, Mr. 
Wells will go to his grave believing that if there is an 
accident, that someone must be at fault. The law is to the 
contrary. The Court instructed the jury to the contrary. Mr. 
Wells took no objection to the Court's instruction that the mere 
fact that an accident happened does not, in and of itself, mean 
that any party was negligent. 
Plaintiff argues that to support the jury's verdict in this 
case, one would have to say that the evidence preponderates in 
favor of a finding that the accident was unavoidable. This 
fallacious argument is simply not so. Accidents do not have to 
be "unavoidable" for a jury to find that neither party was 
negligent. The statement that to support the jury's verdict in 
this case one would have to say that the evidence preponderates 
in favor of a finding that the accident was unavoidable is what 
Mr. Wells wants the law to be, not what the law is or should be. 
If this statement were true, any time a plaintiff files a 
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Complaint the defendant would have the burden of showing that the 
accident was unavoidable. This is simply not the case. 
2. Coons did not have a duty to "slow down.11 
The trial court gave extensive, comprehensive instructions 
on "negligence." (See Instructions 13K-13W, Record at 171-183, 
Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 528-32; Addendum at Tab I.) Plaintiff's 
counsel took not a single objection to any of the trial court's 
instructions. (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 572, lines 24-25.) The "duty" 
defined by the instructions is one of "reasonable care," 
"greater, extra care for children than adults," a "proper 
lookout," a "reasonable and prudent" speed, etc. it was not, as 
plaintiff argues, a duty to "slow down." 
3. Coons did not have a duty to lock in his undivided 
attention on the plaintiff to the exclusion of all else 
on and around the roadway. 
The discussion of the trial court's instructions contained 
in the immediately preceding paragraph applies equally to this 
erroneous argument of plaintiff. Plaintiff wants to characterize 
defendant's testimony that he checked his mirrors as defendant 
"removing his eyes from the road." Every person who has driven a 
vehicle knows that when you check your mirrors that even though 
your eyes are not focused straight ahead down the road, you still 
have a consciousness of what lies ahead of you. If this were not 
so, drivers would be taught to never check their mirrors instead 
of being taught to regularly check their mirrors. 
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Plaintiff's Brief argues that all experts admitted that the 
accident could have been avoided if defendant had begun to react 
when plaintiff entered the roadway. This is not so. Even if it 
were so, it begs the question as to whether Coons was negligent. 
Mr. Stevens gave clear expert testimony, to which plaintiff 
raised not a single objection, that had Coons, as plaintiff 
claims he should have, honed his focus in solely and exclusively 
on young Reynold Johnson, that he would have been negligent by 
ignoring other potential hazards. 
Q And my question to you, sir, is as a driver 
sees northbound on a highway through a town like Manti, 
what should that driver be observing as he proceeds 
northbound up the road? 
A Primarily be observing the road. 
I see that Mr. Coons has placed it would 
southbound vehicles in the--in his drawing. Ah, he 
shows other children on the southeast corner. 
Apparently this is the boy's sister. 
[INDICATED] 
He cannot be--ah--relied upon--or he cannot 
be--or it cannot be demanded or expected of him that he 
concentrates soley fsicl on Ren, who is over at 
position B. 
[INDICATED] 
He has an entire field of vision to take into 
consideration and, ah, I've seen too many accidents 
where, ah, there are other possible accidents occurring 
or potential accidents. You can't--you can't just look 
at something like this by hindsight and say that should 
have been concentrated on because there were other 
possibilities equally as serious as this one. 
Q And what if a driver did focus on iust one 
object in his entire field of vision, for example like 
focusing soley fsicl on Ren at point B? 
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A He would be negligent. 
Q What way? 
A In failing to take into consideration the 
other factors in his field of vision, the other two 
vehicles, the other children such as that, because all 
of that presents potential hazard. 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 383, line 2 through p. 384, line 6.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
4. Conclusion. 
That different facts may have led to no accident is not 
evidence that Coons was negligent; it is nothing more than a form 
of the unpersuasive conclusion that if none of us ever drove 
motor vehicles, there would never be motor vehicle accidents, or 
that if Coons had stayed in bed that day, there would have been 
no accident. 
The jury was perfectly free to reject plaintiff's "facts." 
The jury was perfectly free to reject plaintiff's fallacious 
arguments. The jury was perfectly free to arrive at the 
reasonable conclusion that Mr. Coons was not negligent. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motions for Directed 
Verdict. J.N.O.V.. and New Trial. 
1. Introduction. 
Although plaintiff moved pursuant to subparagraphs 1, 2, 6, 
and 7 of Rule 59, subparagraphs 2 and 7 were not involved. 
Subparagraph 2 of Rule 59 governs misconduct of the jury. 
Plaintiff presented no evidence at the trial court, and still 
presents none, that there was any misconduct of the jury. 
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Subparagraph 7 of Rule 59 addresses "error in law." Plaintiff 
presented no evidence at the trial court, and still presents 
none, that there was any "error in law," 
Thus, plaintiff is left with a Rule 59(6) claim that the 
evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict.3 
2. Applicable Law. 
The opening clause of Rule 59 states "Subject to the 
Provisions of Rule 61 . . . " Rule 61 is captioned "Harmless 
Error." Significantly, the case law on Rule 61, and thus Rule 
59, squarely and clearly places the burden on the party making 
the motion to show not only that an error occurred, but also that 
it was substantial and prejudicial, and that the movant was 
deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration.4 
Further, the case law clearly establishes that judgments are 
presumed valid, that all presumptions are in favor of the 
validity of a verdict and judgment, and that the presumption 
arises that the judgment should not be disturbed unless the 
movant meets the requirement of showing that the error is 
substantial and prejudicial and that there is reasonable 
3Plaintiff also tacked on a Rule 59(1) claim based on an 
alleged "irregularity" by defendant Michael K. Coons in an 
alleged "improper contact" with the jury in an alleged "attempt 
to ingratiate defendant with the jurors and create an improper 
rapport" (emphasis added), but even plaintiff didn't allege that 
the "attempt" was successful, or that the alleged conduct made 
any difference in the result. The alleged improper jury contact 
is discussed fully in POINT II, below. 
4Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987); Onyeabor v. Pro 
Roofing Inc... 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990). 
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likelihood the result would have been different in the absence of 
such error.5 
Finally, the case law provides that it is the duty of the 
Court to disregard errors unless there is error both substantial 
and prejudicial and a reasonable likelihood the result would have 
been different without it. and that the burden is on the movant 
to show not only that there was error, but also that the error 
was prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different 
result.6 
3. Holmes v. Nelson. 
Plaintiff relied almost exclusively on the case of Holmes v. 
Nelson. 326 P.2d 722 (Utah 1958). Plaintiff reads entirely too 
much into the case of Holmes v. Nelson, which simply stands for 
the proposition that the granting of a new trial is largely a 
matter of discretion with the trial judge and that the trial 
judge's decision will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of 
discretion. The two justices in the Holmes concurring opinion, 
5Leiah Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982); Hall v. Blackham. 417 P.2 664 (Utah 1966); Joseph v. W.H. 
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp.. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1960) 
6Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
1991); Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983); 
Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Inv.. Inc.. 522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 
1974); Batt v. State. 503 P.2d 855 (Utah 1972); Ewell & Son. Inc. 
v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 493 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1972); Ortega v. 
Thomas. 383 P.2d 406 (Utah 1963); Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande 
R.R.. 286 P.2d 240 (Utah 1955) 
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Justice Crockett and Justice Wade, pointed out as much. They 
noted: 
That such prerogative [of granting a new trial] 
should be exercised with caution and forbearance 
consistent with his important and imperative duty to 
safeguard the right of trial by jury. The verdict, 
when supported by substantial evidence, should be 
regarded as presumptively correct and should not be 
interfered with merely because the judge might disagree 
with the result. The prerogative should only be 
exercised when, in the view of the trial court, it 
seems clear that the jury has misapplied or failed to 
take into account proven facts; or misunderstood or 
disregarded the law, or made findings clearly against 
the weight of the evidence so that the verdict is 
offensive to his sense of justice to the extent he 
cannot in good conscience permit it to stand. 
Id. at 726 (emphasis added). The dissenting judge, Justice 
Henroid, totally disagreed with the granting of the new trial. 
4. Plaintiff's Affidavits. 
The Affidavits submitted by plaintiff were from obviously 
highly biased and prejudiced litigants - the guardian, himself a 
trial lawyer by trade; the guardians' legal assistant, obviously 
motivated to please his boss; and the plaintiff's mother, obvi-
ously motivated to do everything she possibly can to try to help 
her own son. (Record at 223-28.) The Affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff were sadly mistaken on even the basic facts. The trial 
started on August 4, 1993 and lasted three days. August 5, 1993, 
was the second day of trial, not the first day, as Mrs. Johnson 
swears. The instructional hearing in chambers was on Thursday 
afternoon, August 5, 1993, the second day of the trial. The 
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third and last day of the trial consisted of arguments, instruc-
tions, and deliberations, only. There was no instructional 
hearing in chambers on the third and last day of the trial. 
Defendant's Affidavit, on the other hand, established that 
the conversation apparently complained of was between him and the 
bailiff, not the jurors, and that a juror interjected an innocu-
ous comment as to the location of two people. (See Affidavit of 
Defendant, Record at 253-55; Addendum at Tab J.) For the reasons 
set forth below, such conduct does not, as a matter of law, rise 
to the magnitude of justifying a new trial. 
5. Plaintiff Failed to Meet Plaintiff's Rule 59 Burden of 
Showing Substantial Prejudice and the Reasonable 
Likelihood that the Result Would Have Been Different. 
Plaintiff's post trial motions were nothing more than sour 
grapes about a jury verdict that went against plaintiff. 
Plaintiff utterly failed to meet plaintiff's Rule 59 motion 
burden. Plaintiff failed to show substantial error and 
prejudice. Plaintiff also failed, as is plaintiff's burden, to 
show the reasonable likelihood that the things plaintiff com-
plained about made any difference to the verdict. 
The alleged "church mission" discussion is innocuous. It is 
certainly no less harmful than what came out in voir dire--that 
one of the venire had worked with Mrs. Johnson, the plaintiff's 
mother, at "the temple." (Presumably the LDS Temple in Manti). 
It is also no less sympathy arousing than having both the devoted 
mother, Mrs. Johnson, and the plaintiff, a freshly scrubbed, 
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beautiful boy, with coloring book and story books, present at 
counsel's table adjacent to the jury box throughout the entire 
trial, even though plaintiff's counsel obviously never intended 
to call either as a witness. 
If Coons' conduct were so substantial and prejudicial, or if 
there were any reasonable likelihood that it made any difference 
to the result, one has to wonder why the plaintiff's mother 
and/or the plaintiff's own court appointed guardian, a lawyer by 
trade, didn't call it to the Court's attention during the trial, 
or, for that matter, until more than a full month after the jury 
returned its verdict. 
Plaintiff's affiants all claim it happened right in front of 
their eyes--yet they did nothing about it at the time, and never 
called it to the Court's attention until more than a month later, 
after the jury had been discharged. It just won't wash--their 
inaction belittles any claim of substantiality and prejudice and 
any claim it made any reasonable likelihood of a different 
result. 
In California Fruit Exch. v. Henry. 89 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. 
Pa. 1950); aff'd. 184 F.2d 517 (3d. Cir. 1950), one of the cases 
discussed in Brief of Appellant, the appellate court refused to 
grant a new trial, holding that a court should not grant a new 
trial in the absence of intentional wrong where the communication 
between a party and the jury did not involve the case. Id. 588-
90. In this instance, the alleged communication did not involve 
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the case. Thus, the Henry case cited by plaintiff actually 
supports the position of defendant Coons. 
In Groen v. Tri-O-Inc.. 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the only evidence admissible to impeach a 
jury verdict is that which demonstrates that the verdict was 
determined by chance or resulted from bribery and all other proof 
as to what was said or done in the jury room, including evidence 
that the jury was confused or that it misunderstood or disre-
garded the facts or the applicable law, is inadmissible as 
violative of the policy against attempts to undermine the 
integrity of verdicts. A fortiori the same result should be 
reached in our case. 
In Crookston. supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that on a 
new trial motion based on alleged insufficiency of the evidence, 
the evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party (in this case, defendant Coons), and that the 
movant must first marshall the evidence in support of the 
verdict, and only then show that it is insufficient. This 
plaintiff utterly failed to do so, omitting, among a great many 
other things, testimony of two defense accident reconstruction 
experts, specifically including Captain Knight's opinion that the 
only way Coons could have avoided this accident was by being 
"clairvoyant.n 
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6. Conclusion. 
If there ever was a case that presented a jury question, 
this case was it. The plaintiff had a full and fair day in 
court. The jury simply found against the plaintiff. For all the 
reasons presented herein, the trial court properly denied plain-
tiff's motions for directed verdict, J.N.O.V., and new trial. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF IMPROPER JURY 
CONTACT. 
A. Plaintiff's Affidavits. 
The alleged "evidence11 of improper jury contact consists 
entirely of the affidavits of Andrew Berry (plaintiff's attorney/ 
guardian), Liesl Draper (Mr. Berry's legal assistant), and Doreen 
Johnson (plaintiff's mother). (See Affidavit of Andrew Berry, 
Affidavit of Liesl Draper and Affidavit of Doreen Johnson, all 
filed September 7, 1993. Record at 223-28.) 
Each affidavit indicates that each affiant was aware, prior 
to the time the jury was instructed, and while the judge and 
trial lawyers were in chambers working on jury instructions, that 
the alleged improper contact between defendant and jury members 
occurred. Berry Affidavit at 1 3; Draper Affidavit at 1 3; and 
Johnson Affidavit at 11 3 and 4. 
Neither plaintiff's lawyer/guardian, the lawyer's legal 
assistant, plaintiff's mother, nor anyone else informed the Court 
of the alleged improper contact, or objected in any way to the 
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alleged improper contact, until one month after the jury verdict 
when plaintiff filed his motion for new trial, after a verdict 
adverse to plaintiff. 
B. Plaintiff Cannot Become Aware of Alleged Improper Contact. 
Wait for the Jury Verdict Without Informing the Court of the 
Improper Contact, and Then Move for a New Trial Based on the 
Alleged Improper Contact When the Verdict is Adverse. 
The rule by overwhelming weight of authority is that an 
objection to improper contact with the jury must be made as soon 
as possible, or it is waived: 
As a general rule, if a party obtains knowledge 
during the progress of the trial of acts of jurors, or 
acts affecting them, which he shall wish to urge as 
objections to the verdict, he must object at once, or 
as soon as the opportunity is presented, or be 
considered has having waived his objections. 
See 89 C.J.S. Trial § 483. Compare Broberg v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198 
(Utah App. 1989) (where plaintiff failed to object to trial 
court's failure to ask voir dire questions before jurors were 
empaneled, he could not raise the issue for the first time in a 
motion for a new trial); and Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776 
P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989) (female defendant's claim she was 
denied fair trial because of country's preemptory challenges to 
women jury members would not be considered on appeal where 
defendant failed to present the issue to the trial court until 
after return of adverse verdict). 
For example, in Bernier v. National Fence Co.. 410 A.2d 1007 
(Conn. 1979), the court and parties became aware during trial 
that a juror had seen a newspaper article concerning the details 
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of the case. The court interviewed the juror that had seen the 
article and concluded that the juror's exposure to the article 
resulted in no prejudice. The parties made no objection. 
Subsequently, after the jury returned a verdict for the 
defendant, the plaintiff obtained the article and discovered it 
contained a reference to a worker's compensation lien. Plaintiff 
filed a motion for new trial on the grounds that the jury had 
been prejudiced by the juror's exposure to the article's outside 
influence. The trial court denied the motion. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted in pertinent part as 
follows: 
The record reveals clearly that the plaintiff was 
timely put on notice that a newspaper article of 
potentially prejudicial content was published and read 
by one of the jurors. If the plaintiff believed, for 
any reason, that the court's cautionary instructions to 
the jury or to the panel as a whole were insufficient, 
it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to make a request 
for such remedial action as was felt necessary, at that 
time, and not to reserve possible objections until 
after an adverse verdict was rendered. . . . 
. . . A motion for a new trial for extrinsic causes 
will not be sustained if the ground for it existed at 
the time of trial and was either known to the 
petitioner at the time of trial, or might have been 
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
See 410 A.2d at 1008-09. See also Fontaine v. Federal Paper 
Board Co., 434 N.E.2d 331, 339 (111. App. 1982) ("Only after the 
defendant became aware that the jury had ruled against it and was 
deliberating on damages did it make an objection or move for 
mistrial,w and thus the defendant waived its objections). 
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The reasons for such a rule are obvious. As the court 
stated in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 223 
So. 2d 332 (Fla. App. 1969): 
Had the plaintiff's counsel made a timely objection, the 
trial court would have been given an opportunity to correct 
its error, if any in fact had occurred. By waiting until 
the jury returned its verdict before objecting, we think the 
plaintiff waived its right to object. 
See 223 So. 2d at 333. See also Martin v. Atherton. 116 A.2d 629 
(Maine 1955) ("A party is not permitted to take his chance of a 
favorable verdict, and then, if it is adverse, interpose an 
objection to it based on facts which were known to him before it 
was rendered."). 
In this case plaintiff's own affidavits make clear that 
plaintiff knew full well of the alleged improper contact between 
defendant and the jury. But plaintiff waited until after the 
Court completed its instructions to the jury, until after an 
adverse verdict was returned, until after the jury was 
discharged, and indeed, until one month later before raising the 
issue in the motion for new trial. 
Plaintiff's actions thus prevented the Court from learning 
the scope of the alleged contact on the spot, from being able to 
correct any alleged problems with a cautionary instruction, and 
prejudices both the Court, the parties and the jurors allegedly 
involved by purporting to require a subsequent evidentiary 
hearing now that plaintiff has learned the verdict was adverse. 
Plaintiff's objection to the alleged improper contact between 
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defendant and the jur\ is untimely WJH waived, and should not 
now be the basis of any motion for new trial. 
C. Utah Law is Clear that the Issue Plaintiff Now Attempts 
to Raise has been Waived. 
Utah law is very clear that "issues not raised in the trial 
court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding this court 
[the Court of Appeals] from considering their merits on appeal." 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App 1Q89) 
"It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on 
appeal, the record must clearly show that it was timely presented 
to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling 
thereon." Id. at 655. 
With regard to alleged improper jury contact, the rule is 
that "a motion for a new trial for extrinsic causes will not be 
sustained if the ground for it existed at the time of trial and 
was either known to the petitioner at the time of trial, or might 
have been known through the exercise of reasonable diligence." 
See Bernier v. National Fence Co., 410 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1979) 
(emphasis added). 
in thip case, M? Well's argument is apparently that he has 
not waived his objection to the alleged contact between defendant 
and - v:r because although the plaintiff's attorney guardian 
a .-•-. T -v j:'*a.^  r the contact before the jury was 
instructed, Wells, personally, was not aware of the contact 
at that time Nevertheless, as the Court i t se3 f noted :i n i ts 
Nc ivember 4, 1993, Order: 
The named plaintiff in this case, Andrew B. Berry# Jr., 
is an attorney, licensed to practice law in the State 
of Utah and currently practicing, oft-times before the 
undersigned. Consequently, he would have knowledge 
about the proper relationship between parties and 
jurors. 
See Order of November 4, 1993, at p. 2. 
Clearly the circumstances of this case are such that 
assuming there really was some prejudicial contact between 
defendant and jury members, plaintiff and his trial lawyer 
"should have known of the misconduct through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence." Indeed "there can be but little 
difference, in legal effect, between actual knowledge . . . by 
the [movant for a new trial], at the time of trial, and 
their . . . negligence in not ascertaining it. And it would be 
unjust to subject the [movant for a new trial] to a new trial, by 
reason of such negligence." Bernier, 410 A.2d at 1009. 
D. Conclusion. 
In this case, plaintiff's guardian attorney and his trial 
attorney either admittedly knew, or should have known, about the 
alleged contact between defendant and the jurors, and clearly did 
nothing about it while the Court still had an opportunity to 
instruct the jurors. Rather, they waited to determine whether 
the verdict would be adverse to them before objecting. Under the 
circumstances, Utah law is clear that they have waived their 
objection, and the alleged contact between defendant and the jury 
cannot now be the basis for any motion for a new trial. 
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POINT III 
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL APPEAL TO 
"SYMPATHY. ff 
A Plaintiff Waived this Issue by Not Including It in the 
Docketing Statement.7 
Several cases from the appellate courts of this state have 
indicated that the failure of an appellant to preserve an issue 
in the Docketing Statement constitutes waiver of the issue and 
a bar to the appellate court considering it on appeal. See, 
e.g.. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.. 882 
P.2d 1143, 1144 r i 1 (Utah 1 994); Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs.. 
Ltd.. 735 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1987); C.M.C. Casity. Inc. v. Aird. 
et al.. 707 P.2d 1304# 1305 (Utah 1985); Brooks v. Department of 
Employment Security, 736 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1987) . 
7The plaintiff not only didn't raise the issue in the 
Docketing Statement, but also failed to raise this issue in his 
post-trial motions to the trial court. Plaintiff raised only two 
issues in his post-trial motions. They are found at page 2 of 
plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Post-Trial Motions, Record 
at 232, a copy of which is in the Addendum at Tab K. The only 
two issues raised were: 
ISSUES 
The following issues are raised by this Mot:ion: 
1. Was the evidence insufficient to support the 
verdict? 
2 Was the contact between defendant and members 
of the jury during the trial improper and irregular and 
sufficient to justify a new trial. 
Id. 
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In this case, the plaintiff utterly failed to raise the 
"sympathy" issue in his Docketing Statement. A copy of page 4 of 
the plaintiff's Docketing Statement is included at Tab L of the 
Addendum. It sets forth, at 1 8, the following issues: 
8, Issues presented for review. 
(1) Was the evidence sufficient to preclude 
a finding of no negligence by the jury? 
(2) Was the contact between Coons and 
members of the jury during the trial improper and 
irregular and sufficieot to justify a new trial. 
(3) Should the Court have granted 
plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict or Motion for 
Judgment N.O.V.? 
(4) Can a Court rule there was no unavoid-
able accident, and then allow the jury to rule there 
was no negligence? 
Nowhere is there any reference to the "sympathy" issue the 
plaintiff now attempts to raise. This is another example of 
plaintiff's failure to comply with the basics of appellate 
practice, but rather, attempt to present issues seriatim. 
Plaintiff has waived the "sympathy" issue by failing to raise and 
preserve it in the Docketing Statement. 
B. Plaintiff Has Unclean Hands to Make this Argument. 
Plaintiff has unclean hands to complain about any jury 
appeal to sympathy. Plaintiff's entire case was of passion and 
sympathy, rather than logic and reason, in the hope that, 
although plaintiff pedalled his bike into the side of defendant's 
trailer, the jury would nevertheless feel sorry for plaintiff and 
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give him money Some of the examples of plaintiff's appeals to 
sympathy include: 
1. Little Reynold Johnson, III and his mother were present 
at counsel's table in front of the jury throughout the entire 
trial, even though neither was ever called as a witness. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p 1 8, 1 :i oes I  ~ 10 and p. 19, lines 20-22 and p 20, lines 
5-8.) 
2. Mr. Wells did call Reynold Johnson, Ill's 15-year-old 
sister (12 at the time of the accident) as a witness at trial. 
Mr. Wells' examination of her is found at pp. 189-194 of Tr. Vol. 
I., and had marginal, if any, relevance. It did, however, give 
Mr. Wells opportunities her she had to speak up, even 
though "it's hard" and she is "nervous." It also gave her the 
opportunity to cry in front of the jury. M . at 191. 
3 In his closing argument, Mr. Wells referred to Reynold 
Johnson, III as "cute." (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 559, line 7.) 
C. It Was Not a Sympathy Argument. 
Mr. Coons was not feeling well the first day of the trial. 
The trial judge so told the jury. (Tr. Vol. I., p. 169, line 24 
through p. 17 0, 1ine 1.) 
After Mr. Wells insisted on calling Coons as a witness that 
day, it was necessary to have Coons explain to the jury on cross-
examination that he * a s not in the same shape on the day of his 
alleged inattentiveness that allegedly caused the accident as he 
was four years later on the day he testified to the jury. 
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Therefore, the following testimony was given, without a single 
objection from the plaintiff: 
Q How are you feeling today, Mr. Coons? 
A Pretty sick. 
Q Were you in the kind of condition on October 
27th of 1989 that you are today? 
A No, sir. 
Q How were you feeling on October 27th of 1989? 
A I was feeling like I was when I first came 
into this courtroom, which was healthy. But I only 
have a lasting power of about two hours and then my 
disabilities begin to show. 
Q And what was it that caused you your 
disability? 
A I had a parachute malfunction from 800 feet. 
Q And that was at Fort Bragg in 1983? 
A Yes, sir. I was an infantry captain. 
Q Can you tell me how many major operations 
you've had on your body? 
A 13. 
Q Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen of 
the jury what happens to you when your--what did you 
call them? Your--? 
A The post traumatic. 
Q No. Your maintenance, after a couple of 
hours you said started to what--
THE COURT: The word he used was "disabilities." 
MR. HENDERSON: Your disabilities, yeah. 
WITNESS: My mind clouds. I stutter. I can't 
connect thoughts together to be able to be expressive. 
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I have a masters degree in business, but it hasn't; done 
me much good since the accident. 
(Tr. Vol. i, t *6, line 23 through p. 248, line 3.) 
Defense counsel's opening statement was nothing more than an 
explanation why Mr. Coons was not in the same shape on the day of 
his alleged inattentiveness that allegedly caused the accident as 
he was four years later when he appeared in front of the jury. 
The opening statement simply told the jury what the evidence 
would be on that point (which said evidence was later received 
without a single objection from plaintiff). "It is well settled 
that trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence are not 
to be overtur ned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." 
State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988). The entirety 
of the opening statement that plaintiff now complains of is set 
forth here: 
You may have observed Mike Coons has been here in 
the courtroom today, but he doesn't look too good 
today. He didn't sleep last night and he went to the 
hospital at 5:00 o'clock this morning and got a shot of 
demerol. And he's in pain and this stems from a 
parachute accident he had when he was on active duty in 
the--
MR. WELLS: Your Honor, I'm goi ng t :o object. This 
is a ploy to sympathy. 
MR. HENDERSON: It's not a ploy for sympathy. 
It's an explanation of why he doesn't look too good 
today and why he's in pain, because I'm sure that--and 
I won't dwell on it. I'll briefly touch on it and then 
move on. It's certainly no more than his effort at 
sympathy. 
THE COURT: Okay. Overruled. 
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You can continue. 
MR. HENDERSON: Thank you. 
He had a parachute accident in 1983 when he was on 
active duty in Fort Bragg in the 82nd Airborne 
Division. He was seriously injured. He's had 13 
surgeries and he does have a lot of pain. 
In October of 1989 he was between surgeries and he 
was feeling fairly well and it should have been a happy 
day for him and it started out a happy day. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 114, line 21 through p. 115, line 18.) 
Thus, the only thing plaintiff objected to was the reference 
in opening statement, not testimony or closing argument, to 
Mr. Coons' pain that resulted from a parachute accident. It was 
not an appeal to sympathy, but was, rather, a preview of the evi-
dence why Coons appeared as he did to the jury, and to contrast 
that with his condition on the day of the accident four years 
earlier. It later came into evidence through the testimony of 
Mr. Coons without a single objection. 
The admissibility of evidence is so far within the 
discretion of the trial court that it will not be overturned 
absent abuse of discretion. Griffiths, supra. This cannot 
seriously be argued to constitute abuse of discretion. The law 
of this jurisdiction is that a trial court's ruling on whether 
counsel's conduct warrants a mistrial will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Speer. 750 P.2d 186 
(Utah 1988). Surely the innocuous introductory remarks of 
counsel in opening statement regarding what the evidence is going 
to be about a party's appearance in court as opposed to the day 
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of the accident is -: • * rounds for a inist:r™ia 1, and the trial 
judge's overruling the objection to the comments was within 
his discretion. 
D. ftt Trial. Plaintiff Blessed or Waived What He Now Condemns. 
Cases are legion holding that a party may not, on appeal, 
complain about something at the trial court l>e party invited, 
acquiesced d n, tacit] y concurred - .t - = position on appeal 
inconsistent with the position taken in the trial court. See, 
e.g.. Estate of Justheim v. Ebert. 824 P.2d 432, 43 6 (Utah App. 
1991); Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 78 7 E 2d 52 5 52 7 (Utah 
App. 1990); Samaden Oil Corp. v. The Corp. Comm'n of the State of 
Oklahoma, 755 P.2d 664, 668 'Okl. 1988). 
It Is important to consider plaintiff's action and inaction 
in the trial court to the things he complains of here, with this 
legal principle in mind. 
1. In his closing argument, Mr. Wells referred t~ 
Mr. Coons' "unfortunate accident" and that Mr. Coons "doesn't 
feel well and is disabled." iTx Vol III, | . 5"i»9( lines y lu I 
2. Even though Mr. Coons was quite sick on the first day 
of the trial, Mr. Wells insisted on calling him as a witness that 
day. (Tr. Vol I p 19'; >"
 (l line If 1J We I I B then stated in 
front of the jury, "We may need take a five-minute recess so 
we can get him here." (13. at lines 4-5 ) 
3. When, appear, Mr We3 1 s stated on hi s own, 
volunteered, in the presence of the jury, "I think it will be 
easier for Mr. Coons if the Clerk could administer the oath 
without him having to get up again." (Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 198, 
lines 10-12.) 
4. After the Court accepted Mr. Wells' invitation for 
Coons to take the oath without rising,1 and after Coons stated he 
would tell the truth, the Court and Mr. Wells had the following 
colloquy: 
THE COURT: I'm satisfied that he's taken the 
oath. Are you, Mr. Wells? 
MR. WELLS: That's fine. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 198, lines 18-20.) 
E. The Judge Gave the Jury Repeat Instructions to Not Decide 
the Case on Sympathy and Defense Counsel Asked the Jury to 
Decide the Case on the Factst Not Sympathy. 
In defense closing argument to the jury, defense counsel 
told the jury: 
The question for you is was Mike Coons negligent? 
Or was he not? If you find he exercised reasonable 
care, the answer to that question is he was not 
negligent. 
I need your help on this. I need your vote on 
this. Not out of as maybe Mr. Wells has suggested some 
time during this trial, not out of sympathy for Mike 
Coons. But because it's the right result, based on the 
evidence. And I do want you to decide this case on the 
evidence and the law given to you by the Judge. 
*On appeal, plaintiff makes the crass and undignified 
allegation that this somehow indicates that the trial judge was 
sympathetic to Coons. If anything, the trial judge was 
sympathetic to the plaintiff, as evidenced by the trial court 
refusing to award defendant $1,120.55 in uncontested taxable 
costs. (See Memorandum of Costs, Record at 214-217, Addendum at 
Tab M; Judgment on Special Verdict, Record at 219, Addendum at 
Tab D.) 
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Really my only worry in this case is that you'll 
decide this case based on sympathy, compassion, and 
preiudice. I want you to decide it on the evidence, 
and the right result on the evidence is this accident 
was not the fault of Mike Coons. It just wasn't. 
(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 557, line 20 through p. 558, line 8.) 
(Emphasis added ) 
Prior to the evidence, the trial judge gave the jury 
extensive preliminary instructions, (Tr. Vol. I, pp 103-107 and 
1 ] 8 120 ) These :i nsti: uctions specifica] 1 y I ncl uded the 
instruction "Consider the evidence fairly, without any bias or 
sympathy toward either side." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 119, lines 5-6.) 
(Emphasis added ) 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court gave 
the jury instructions that fill up pages 522 through 533 of Tr. 
Vol. 111. These instructions specifically included the instruc-
tion, "You must weigh and consider this case without regard to 
sympathy, preiudice. or passion for or against any party to the 
action." T T T * : . lines 8-10.) (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiff's counsel took not a single objection to any of 
t he t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s (Tr Vo.l . I l l , p, i>/2, ] i nes 4-
25.) 
F. If There Was Any Jury Sympathy for Coons, it Resulted from 
the Protracted, Abusive Examination of Coons by Plaintiff's 
Counsel in Front of the Jury. 
If the jury did have any sympathy for Mr. Coons# it was only 
because of Mr. Wells' protracted, abusive examination of 
Mr. Coons as a witness. After Mr. Wells had already grilled 
Mr. Coons extensively9 (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 199-245), and after 
9For example, after already grilling Mr. Coons repeatedly, 
Mr. Wells and Mr. Coons had this interchange: 
A To get the first two cars to slow down, yes, 
sir. 
Q And you didn't see him do that? 
A No, sir. When I heard the commotion I turned 
and looked and saw that he was there and when I did, I 
shifted into the righthand lane, honking and stepping 
on my brake. 
Q Is there some reason why you couldn't see him 
just before you heard the commotion? 
A Huh-huh. He wasn't moving. It only takes a 
second to do that. 
Q One second? 
A Please, let's not be that specific. I'm not 
that good at kind of time. None of us are. 
Q Well what I'm trying to get you to admit, 
Mr. Coons, is that there was some period of time out 
there where he went from a dead stop to full speed when 
you weren't watching him. 
A Sir, we don't know that he was at full speed, 
but we could have him ride a bike and see. 
Q Well, you testified that he was going really 
fast. 
A Yes, sir. But I didn't say "full speed." 
Q All right. But from a dead stop to really 
fast and you didn't see that happen? 
A He had to go really fast to get that far 
across the intersection to hit my trailer. 
Q And you didn't see that happen? 
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Mr. Coons cried when he told the jury, "You don't--you haver 
been involved with accidents with kids and just walk away.n (Tr. 
Vol. T n_ 549, lines 13 17.) Mr. Wells insisted on standing up 
on re-direct examination and pointlessly grilling Mr. Coons: 
Q Don't you think it would have helped if you'd 
have been paying attention to where you could see Ren 
start up and start to come into the street? 
A Please, Mr. Wells, I tried and I was as 
attentive as any other driver would be. And I felt the 
pain of that mother and her son and the rest of those 
children for a long time. Please don't do this any 
more. 
Q Mr. Coons, I'm not saying you're a bad 
person. 
A I wa s attentive. 
Q What I'm saying is I think you made a mistake 
and I think the mistake was that you weren't looking 
ahead of your vehicle as you should have been. And I'm 
asking you if you had seen Ren start up and come out 
into that street, don't you think there's something 
more you might have been able to do? 
A Yes, si r. I've told you and you've told me 
when I saw him out the side. The trooper explained to 
you, too, that I saw him out my side window and I moved 
over out of the way and braked at the same time, hoping 
to avoid a collision with the young man. And appar-
ently, according to the other testimony, even though he 
had bad brakes he put his feet on the ground to try and 
stop, too. 
Q So he was trying to stop; you were trying to 
stop. 
A If he wasn't going very fast, he wouldn't 
have had to worry about dragging his feet to stop. I 
don't know why we have to drag him through this anyway. 
He's a sweet young man and it seems like we are just 
beating this out. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 228, line 1 to p. 229, line 14.) 
MR, HENDERSON: Your Honor, I'm going to object. 
He's been over this and over it and over it and the 
witness has answered it. 
THE COURT: I think that's asked and answered. 
That objection is sustained. 
We'll instruct you not to answer that question. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 250, lines 4-24.) 
X. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff had his day in court. The jury fully heard and 
rejected all of the unpersuasive arguments that the plaintiff now 
attempts to re-hash here. In view of the basic facts of the 
case, i.e., the plaintiff pedalled his bicycle into the side of 
the trailer being towed behind defendant's motor vehicle, it is 
not at all surprising that the jury would conclude that the 
defendant was not negligent. To the contrary, it is a highly 
foreseeable result on these facts. Plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
verdict. Plaintiff has failed to come forward with any other 
meritorious, persuasive argument as to why plaintiff should get a 
second bite at the apple. Plaintiff waived any claim of improper 
jury conduct, and there was no prejudicial appeal to "sympathy." 
This Court should affirm the judgment on the Special Verdict in 
favor of defendant, and against plaintiff, no cause of action. 
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January, 19 95. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEK 4ARTINEAU 
By 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
ADDENDUM 
Tab A Copy of Rule 59(a) and Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 
Tab B Stipulation, Motion and Order to Try the Case on 
Liability, Only (Record at 60-62.) 
Tab C Special Verdict (Record at 213.) 
Tab D Judgment on Special Verdict (Record at 218-20.) 
Tab E Order Denying Motion for JNOV and New Trial on Alleged 
Insufficiency of Evidence (Record at 273-75.) 
Tab F Order on Motion to Vacate Evidentiary Hearing (Record 
at 291-93.) 
Tab G Order Denying Motion for New Trial Based on Alleged 
Improper Jury Contact (Record at 327-28.) 
Tab H Jamie Johnson Trial Exhibit 34 
Tab I Jury Instructions on "Negligence" (Record at 171-83; 
Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 528-32.) 
Tab J Affidavit of Michael K. Coon (Record at 253-55.) 
Tab K Page 2 of Plaintiff/Appellant's Memorandum in Support 
of Post-Trial Motions (Record at 232.) 
Tab L Page 4 of Plaintiff/Appellant's Docketing Statement 
Tab M Memorandum of Costs (Record at 214-17.) 
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Tab A 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the' 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
TabB 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Civil No. 0920600128 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Judge David Mower 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
The plaintiff, by and through his guardian and by and 
through his counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through 
his counsel of record, hereby stipulate to try this case on 
liability only, submitting the case to the jury on a special 
verdict form which shall pose two questions: 
1. Was Michael K. Coons negligent? (and if 
the answer is flyesfl) 
2. Was the negligence of Michael K. Coons a 
proximate cause of the injuries of 
plaintiff?; 
,:
' 2 1 L;s 
OMiv , 
and, in the event the jury answers yes to both questions, to 
settle the case for $100,000. The parties move the Court for an 
Order in accordance with this Stipulation. 
DATED this ,?_r~<iay of June, 1993. 
ROBERT J & ASSOCIATES 
ID T. WELLS' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ORDER 
The court having reviewed the file, and having met with 
counsel for the parties and the guardian for and on behalf of 
Reynold Johnson, III, a minor, and being fully advised in the 
premises, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that: this case will 
proceed to trial on August 5, 1993, on liability only. In the 
event the jury finds that Michael K. Coons was negligent and that 
his negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, 
upon presentment of an appropriate Petition for Settlement of a 
Minor's Claim, the Court will enter an appropriate Order 
approving the settlement in the amount of $100,000 agreed to by 
the parties. 
day of June, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 
,/ >,.. 
DAVID'L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
TabC 
o Ffl Z 32 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SANPETE COUNTY 
UJl!MiL,.^'-. 
Andrew B. Berry, Jr., as 
guardian for and on behalf of 
Reynold Johnson III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Michael K. Coons, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Case number 920600128 
Judge David L. Mower 
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, we, the jury, find 
as follows: 
1. Was the defendant, Michael K. Coons, negligent? 
Yes 
s'' No 
(If you answered "No" to question number 1, then your work 
is finished. Sign the verdict and notify the bailiff.) 
2. Was the negligence of Michael K. Coons a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries? 
Yes 
No 
Signed on August ir , 1993. 
/ 
Jury Chair 
TabD 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. 0920600128 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Judge David Mower 
Defendant. 
This case having come on regularly for jury trial on August 
4, 5, and 6, 1993, and the jury having answered the Special 
Verdict: 
1. Was the defendant Michael K. Coons negligent? 
Yes 
No x 
NOW, THEREFORE, based thereon, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: Judgment be, and hereby is entered 
in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, no cause of action, 
hi: .'ii do 
y;'3j/tL*n^^ 
and that defendant be, and hereby is awarded costs in the amount 
of $ a CO o> \s-
DATED this day of August, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
i 
. x 
Apprc*ted*as ta-~f.ortii: <F 
ROBERT J. TteSW?" & ASSOCIATES 
Edward T. Wells 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
I- Udili* 
DAVID.-«OWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for defendant herein; that she served the attached Proposed 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT (Case Number 0920600128, Sixth 
Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County) upon the 
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Q el 
and causing the same to be hand-delivered on the J_ day of 
August, 1993. 
Donna Campbell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^X^ day of August, 
1993. 
IBLIC yy NOTARY RU I 
Residing in the Sta 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JANEEN BEAQLEY 
#10 Eichanft Pttm #1100 
Saft Ufc» Cfty . U * i $4111 
ftfy Co»«***on Expires 
*rfyt1,1t#4 
•TATE OF UTAH 
TabE 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as ORDER 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. 0920600128 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Judge David Mower 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff!s Motion for JNOV and Motion for New Trial came on 
regularly for a hearing on September 27, 1993. The plaintiff was 
represented by Edward T. Wells of the law firm Robert J. DeBry & 
Associates, the defendant was represented by Robert H. Henderson 
of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau. The Court had 
fully reviewed the Motion, Memoranda, and Affidavits on file. 
The Court fully heard more than an hour of oral argument on the 
pending Motions. The Court considers itself to be fully 
informed. 
The Court is of the opinion that this case presented fact 
questions for the jury, and that the evidence is sufficient to 
\J . 
support the jury's verdict. Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT 
HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for JNOV be, and hereby is denied; 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial based on the alleged 
insufficiency of the evidence be, and hereby is denied. 
It is further ordered that Plaintiff's Motion for a New 
Trial based on the alleged improper conduct of the defendant be, 
and hereby is set down for an evidentiary hearing at 3:00 p.m. on 
November 17, 1993, at which the Court will hear live testimony, 
under •flact^ /• fljpm the four affiants on file. 
*• TDATEb tteCf-^ V - day of October, 1993. 
I ! i - •- s\ ] • 
BY THE COURT: 
' ' « 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
V \ -• ' ,,/ ? DAVID L. MOWER 
Appf\¥mMti"*f —to form: 
ROBERT DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
By 
Edward T. Wells 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for defendant herein; that she served the attached Proposed ORDER 
(Case Number 0920600128, Sixth Judicial District Court in and for 
Sanpete County) upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
w w^ d aay 0f September, 1993. 
Tonna Campbell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /?}Cv day of 
September, 1993 
r\ 
V ft-YMruY. (VtOh 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CONNIE CALO 
10 Excftango Plaeo. 11th Fi 
Salt la** city. Utah 841 p 
My Commission Expires 
Stptsmoo* 2.1997 
STATS OP UTAH 
TabF 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SANPETE COUNTY --• 
160 North Main, Manti, Utah 84642 ^JA 
Telephone (801) 835-2131 Facsimile (801) 835-21 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER ON MOTIONS (l)FOR 
EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OF 
MOTION TO VACATE 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING and (2) 
TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 
VS. 
Case number 920600128 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Judge David L. Mower 
Defendant. 
Defendant's motion for Expedited Disposition of Motion to 
Vacate Evidentiary Hearing is granted. The Motion to Vacate 
Evidentiary Hearing set for November 17, 1993 is granted. All 
counsel should inform their witnesses that appearance on November 
17, 1993 is not required and that the hearing has bsen vacated. 
The sole remaining issue to be decided by the Court in this 
case is described generally by the phrase "improper contact 
between parties and jurors." However, a more specific 
description of the issues perhaps would include phrases such as 
"waiver," and "imputed knowledge" and "timing." I will attempt 
to explain in more detail. 
9311041.M 
Berry vs. Coons - 920600128 
ORDER ON MOTIONS (1) FOR EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OF MOTION TO VACATE 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING and (2) TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY HEARING, Page 2 
Plaintiff has claimed that there was improper contact 
between the defendant and some jury members during a time when 
the Court was in recess, but the Judge and the lawyers were in 
chambers working on jury instructions. Affidavits describing 
these contacts have been provided by Andrew B. Berry, Liesl H. 
Draper and Doreen Johnson. 
Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Wells, claims that he didn't bring 
the matter of improper contacts to the Court's attention until 
after the verdict because he didn't know about them. 
The named plaintiff in this case, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., is 
an attorney, licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and 
currently practicing, oft-times before the undersigned. 
Consequently, he would have knowledge about the proper 
relationship between parties and jurors. 
Because of that situation, I would like Mr. Wells to provide 
me with a brief or a memorandum which helps to answer these 
question: Why shouldn't the plaintiff's knowledge about improper 
contacts be imputed to plaintiff's counsel? And, if plaintiff's 
counsel had knowledge about the improper contacts, doesn't it 
constitute a waiver of any claim based thereon if plaintiff fails 
to bring the matter to the Court's attention before the matter is 
9311041.1* 
Berry vs. Coons - 920600128 
ORDER ON MOTIONS (1) FOR EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OF MOTION TO VACATE 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING and (2) TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY HEARING, Page 3 
submitted to the jury for decision? 
Unless Mr. Wells requests an enlargement of time, I will 
deny his motion for a new trial, completely and in full, based on 
ile on December 1, 1993. the mfi*8!?ffilM3^ \«tf^ ich I have in the f le 
^£/^a^5^^No\^er _—' 1993' 
'Jm.lu^-
David L. Mower, Judge 
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On November _ £ _ _ , 1993 a copy of the above ORDER ON MOTIONS (1) FOR 
EXPEDITED DISPOSITION OF MOTION TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY HEARING and 
(2) TO VACATE EVIDENTIARY HEARING was sent to each of the following by the 
method indicated: 
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V— ' M ' U. * 
Mr. Edward T. Wells 
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ASSOCIATES 
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MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Fl. 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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JTAH ^ ^ -DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF U
SANPETE COUNTY 
160 North Main, Manti, Utah 84842 
Telephone (801) 835-2131 Facsimile (801) 835-2121 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a ainor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL 
Case number 92060&12B 
Judge DAVID L. MOWER 
Plaintiff's aotion for a new trial is denied. The aotion 
was based on alleged improper contacts between defendant and soae 
Jurors during a time when the Court was in recess but before the 
natter had been submitted to the jury for decision. 
The aotion is denied because plaintiff failed to raise the 
issue in a tiaely fashion. Failure to object on a tiaely basis 
constitutes a waiver of the claiaed error. 
,^T SiMii&&jfaanuary 1 . 1994. 
If / ^C^' 
d L. Mower, Judge 
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4252 South 700 East 10 Exchange Place 11th 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 Floor 
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control to prevent it from running over Renyold Johnson; 
failing to keep a proper lookout for pedestrians; failing to 
yield the right of way to a pedestrian; traveling too fast 
for existing conditions; and failing to operate his vehicle 
at a safe speed to allow him to stop without running over 
Renyold Johnson; failing to exercise appropriate caution 
upon observing children close to the roadway; failing to 
reduce speed at an intersection; failing to reduce speed in 
the presence of pedestrians; failing to exercise appropriate 
care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian. 
To return a verdict for plaintiff Renyold Johnson 
you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Michael K. Coons was negligent and the negligence of Michael 
K. Coons was an proximate cause of injuries to Renyold 
Johnson. 
No. 13K. Negligence is the failure to do what a 
reasonable and prudent person would have done under the 
circumstances or doing what such person under such 
circumstancess would not have done. The fault may lie in 
acting or in omitting to act. 
No. 13L. You will note that the person whose 
conduct we set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily 
cautious individual nor the exceptionally skillful one, but 
a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. While 
exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and 
jm\jct ^i£*? 
10 
1 encouraged, the law does not demand them as a general 
2 standard of conduct. 
3 No. 13M. A person must exercise greater care for 
4 the protection of young children than adults. One dealing 
5 with children must anticipate the ordinary behavior of 
6 children, the fact that they usually cannot and do not 
7 exercise the same degree of prudence for their own safety as 
8 adults, that they are often thoughtless and impulsive 
9 II imposes the duty to exercise a degree of vigilance and 
caution commensurate with such circumstancess in dealing 
11
 with children. 
12
 No. 13M. When a child is known to be in a 
13 situation of possible danger, a driver has a duty to observe 
n extra caution for his safety. Failure to do so is 
15 negligence. 
16 No. 130. You are instructed that because of his 
17 II age Renyold Johnson was not negligent--"--no. 
"13P. It is the duty of the driver of any 
vehicle to exercise ordinary care at all times to avoid 
placing others in danger and to obey all statutes, 
ordinances, and rules of the road designed to promote 
22 II safety. Failure to do so is evidence of negligence. 
23 No. 13Q. Every person operating a motor vehicle 
24
 || must have the vehicle under reasonable control. A vehicle 
is under reasonable control when the driver is observing 
18 
19 
20 
21 
25 
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1
 others using the road and has the ability to guide and 
2
 direct the course of the automobile, fix its speed, and 
3
 I] bring the automobile to a stop within reasonable distance. 
In that regard every driver is obliged to keep a lookout for 
bicyclists and highway conditions which reasonably may be 
anticipated to keep the vehicle Under proper control, to 
7
 || drive a safe speed having proper regard for the width, 
8
 || surface, and condition of the highway, other traffic, 
visibility, and any existing or potential hazards. 
The law provides that any person--"excuse me. 
This is No. 13H. "The law provides that any person driving 
a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a proper 
lookout. A proper lookout means maintain the lookout that 
an ordinarily careful person would use in light of all 
present conditions and those reasonably to be anticipated. 
A proper lookout includes a duty to see objects and 
conditions in plain sight, to see that which is open and 
apparent and to realize obvious dangers. This duty does not 
merely require looking, but also requires observing and 
understanding other traffic and the general situation. 
No. 13S. It is the duty of every person using a 
public street or highway, whether as a pedestrian or as a 
driver in a vehicle, to exercise ordinary care at all times 
to avoid placing one's self or others in danger and to use 
reasonable care to avoid causing an accident. 
1 
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No. 13T. UTAH CODE--"--that abreviation stands 
for annotated, and that's probably a word that none of you 
has ever seen before. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED is the collection 
of all of the laws that's been passed by our legislature and 
I'm gonna quota couple of laws for you. So that's what 
that's referring to, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
"Section 41-6-46(1) provides in part as 
follows: A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the existing 
conditions, given regard to the actual and potential hazard 
that existed, including when approaching and crossing, an 
intersection and special hazards exist due to other traffic. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant conducted himself in violation of the statute just 
read to you, which is proposed for the safety of Renyold 
Johnson and persons in whose class he was at the time, such 
conduct is evidence of negligence. 
No. 13U. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 41-6-80 
provides in pertinent part as follows: The operator of a 
motor vehicle shall give an audible signal when necessary 
and exercise appropriate precaution upon observing any 
child. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant conduct--"--should say--"--conducted 
himself in violation of the statute just read to you, which 
PAGE 532 
1 is proposed for the safety of Renyold Johnson and persons in 
2 whose class he was at the time, such conduct is evidence of 
3
 negligence. 
4
 No. 13V. Every driver has a duty to drive at a 
5
 speed that is safe under the circumstances with proper 
6
 regard for existing and potential hazards. The posted speed 
7
 lirnit at the time of this accident was 35 miles per hour. 
8
 This speed limit is reasonable in the absence of any special 
9
 II hazards. Speed in excess of the posted limit constitutes 
evidence of negligence. Regardless of the speed limit, all 
drivers must drive at an appropriate reduced speed when 
approaching and crossing an intersection when the 
pedestrians are present or when required to do so because of 
weather or other special highway conditions. 
No. 13W. Even if a driver complies with an 
applicable statute, ordinance, or safety rule, this does not 
17
 || make that driver immune from the duty to act with reasonable 
18 
care in other respects. One must always maintain a proper 
lookout for other traffic and hazards reasonably anticipated 
on the highway and keep one's car under proper control. 
No. 13X. It is your duty to make findings of 
fact as to the questions I will submit to you. In making 
your findings of fact you should bear in mind that the 
burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party 
claiming the fact to be true. And that fact must be proved 
10 
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C M , *" " ~ 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL K. COONS 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. Civil No. 0920600128 
MICHAEL K. COONS, Judge David Mower 
Defendant. 
Michael K. Coons, being first duly sworn, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. I am the defendant in this case. 
2. The facts stated herein are based upon my own personal 
knowledge. 
3. I have read the Affidavits of Andrew Berry, Liesl 
Draper, and Doreen Johnson in this case, all dated 6 or 7 
September, 1993. 
4. The Affidavits are in error in a major way. I never 
approached any member of the jury and engaged them in 
conversation until after the trial was over. 
On one occasion, I was in the courtroom speaking with the 
court bailiff about his job. The conversation turned to the 
current location of a person we both knew. A juror, on the 
juror's own, unsolicited by me or the bailiff, interjected that 
the person the bailiff and I were talking about and her husband 
were working for the church in Israel. Nothing else was 
discussed. 
Further, affiant sayeth not. 
I duly acknowledge that I have read the foregoing Affidavit, 
understand the same, and that the contents are true of my own 
knowledge. 
DATED this /7 day of September, 1993. 
MicHael K. Coons 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the / l day of September, 1993, personally appeared 
before me Michael K. Coons, the signer of the above instrument, 
who, upon being duly sworn, acknowledged under oath that he had 
read the foregoing, understands the same, and executed the same 
as his own free act and deed. 
Jotary Public 
Residing in State of Ut 
H lUUo^AttVlfkHlLic™ 
DONNA L CAMPBELL I 
10 EMnwig* Pitt* 
Hm iwkw ctif, utin ItyCommiMJonEx;:' 
Jury 15. 1993 
STATE OP UT . 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
) 
: ss, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for defendant herein; that she served the attached AFFIDAVIT OF 
MICHAEL K. COONS (Case Number 0920600128, Sixth Judicial District 
Court in and for Sanpete County) upon the parties listed below by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the £A& day of September, 1993 
TX^ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ o — d a y of 
September, 1993. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires; 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Sharon McCormick 
10 Exchangt Piaca 11m F\ 
Salt Laka City, Utah §4145 
My Commission Expirts 
Saptambar IS, 1997 
STATE OF UTAH 
TabK 
On August 30, 1993, judgment in favor of defendant was 
duly entered by the court clerk. 
ISSUES 
The following issues are raised by this Motion: 
1. Was the evidence insufficient to support the 
verdict? 
2. Was the contact between defendant and members of the 
jury during the trial improper and irregular and sufficient to 
justify a new trial. 
FACTS 
1. The accident in question happened at 400 North and 
Main Street in Manti, Utah at approximately 6:00 p.m. on October 
28, 1989. 
2. Main Street runs north and south in front of the 
home of plaintifffs parents. 
3. The highway is 62% feet wide from curb to curb. 
4. There are two (2) southbound lanes, two (2) north-
bound lanes and two (2) parking lanes. 
5. The point of impact was approximately 8-10 feet west 
of the eastside curb line. 
6. The speed limit was 35 miles per hour. 
7. Defendant was northbound at 25 miles per hour. 
8. Defendant saw plaintiff on the side of the road to 
2 
TabL 
Judge, Coons had improper contacts with jury members. The extent 
of this contact is disputed. Counsel for plaintiff did not become 
aware of these contacts until after the jury had been dismissed. 
The jury found Mr. Coons not to have been negligent in 
any degree. 
8. Issues presented for review. 
(1) Was the evidence sufficient to preclude a 
finding of no negligence by the jury? 
(2) Was the contact between Coons and members of 
the jury during the trial improper and irregular and sufficient to 
justify a new trial. 
(3) Should the Court have granted plaintiffs 
motion for a directed verdict or Motion for Judgment N.O.V.? 
(4) Can a Court rule there was no unavoidable 
accident, and then allow the jury to rule there was no negligence? 
9. Determination of Case bv Supreme Court. 
This case involves issues of first impression which 
should be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
10. Determinative Law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46; 
Utah Code Ann, S 41-6-80; 
U.R-C.P.: Rule 59; 
California Fruit Exchange v, Henry, 89 F.Supp. 580 
(W.D.Pa. 1950); 
Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722 
(1958); 
Kilpack v. Wicmall, 604 P.2d 462 (Utah 1979). 
4 
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ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANDREW B. BERRY, JR., as MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
guardian for and on behalf of 
REYNOLD JOHNSON, III, a minor 
child, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL K. COONS, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says that he is counsel for defendant in the above-referenced 
action, and that to his knowledge the following costs are correct 
and were necessarily incurred in this action: 
CLERK'S FEE: 
Jury Fee $ 50.00 
-i.1 p.H 2 26 
r 
''Q-fllbinJLstz:v 
Civil No. 0920600128 
Judge David Mower 
subtotal $ 50.00 
WITNESSES AT TRIAL: 
Newell Knight, witness fee plus mileage $ 79.50 
David C. Stephens, witness fee plus $ 79.50 
mileage 
Allen Plant, witness fee plus mileage $ 85.00 
and service of process on Allen 
Plant 
Jason Plant, witness fee plus mileage $ 85.00 
and service of process on Jason 
Plant 
subtotal 329.00 
DEPOSITIONS USED AT TRIAL 
Michael K. Coons 
Newell Knight 
subtotal 
DEPOSITIONS ESSENTIAL TO PREPARATION 
FOR TRIAL 
David c. Stephens 
Doreen Johnson, Jamie Johnson and 
Patrick J. Coons 
$ 48.75 
$ 265.75 
$ 314.50 
$ 
$ 
97.65 
329.40 
DATED this \A jv 
subtotal 
GRAND TOTAL 
day of August, 1993. 
$ 427.05 
$ 1,120.55 
-2-
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /O 
f?/4fJJ&t , 1993. 
d 
day of 
lonNDxpaCTisii,! -j 
DONNA L. CAMr^^LL 
S»t u>h» City, WieH ; •' 
My Commission C -
July 15. ISSj" 
CTATC or irr 
io tary P u b l i c 
R e s i d i n g i n S a l t Lake t y , Utah 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: 85. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
for defendant herein; that she served the attached MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS (Case Number 0920600128, Sixth Judicial District Court in 
and for Sanpete County) upon the parties listed below by placing 
a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Edward T. Wells 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the fO day of August, 1993. 
Donna Campbell 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \Q day of August, 
1993 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 27th day of January, 1995, I served 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee by 
first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: Edward T. 
Wells, ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES, 4252 South 700 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84107. 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorney for Appellees 
